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Valorization
In this chapter we discuss how we can create value from the knowledge
provided in this thesis.10 This dissertation consists of three papers. The
first two paper are about infinite player games, and the last paper is
about infinite action multi battle n-player dynamic contests. These pa-
pers fall into the realm of non-cooperative game theory which analyzes
individuals and self-enforced group strategies when they face a strategic
interaction.
Doing it now, later or never
In this paper, we distinguish decision makers into two types, sophisti-
cated and naive, and corresponding solution concepts sophisticated and
naive equilibria. Sophisticated decision makers know how their own
preferences will change in the future whereas a naive decision maker has
erroneous beliefs about his/her future preferences. We show that a deci-
sion maker who faces an ambiguous due date for a task, sophisticated
decision makers are more inclined to execute the task earlier than the
naive ones. We achieve the ambiguous due date for a task by supposing
that the game consists of infinite time periods. For example, consider a
10Article 23 of the “Regulation governing the attainment of doctoral degrees” at Maastricht
University states: “Knowledge valorization refers to the ‘process of creating value from knowledge,
by making knowledge suitable and / or available for social (and / or economic) use and by
making knowledge suitable for translation into competitive products, services, processes and new
commercial activities’ (adapted definition based on the National Valorization Committee 2011:8).”
93
Valorization
person who tries to quit smoking. Each day he has two choices, quitting
today or quitting tomorrow. It is clear that never quitting is the worst
scenario for your health so any other choice is better. Here our study
suggests that the quiting probability of a sophisticated person is higher
than a naive person.
Moreover to show the existence of naive and sophisticated equilibria
we suppose that the payoffs are upper semi-continuous but not nec-
essarily continuous. An example of such payoffs are the cases where
stopping the game corresponds to making a costly investment, such as
in the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. Since it is too late to make
investment to avoid the disastrous outcome, not making the investment
at all is preferred in such cases.
Perfect information games where each player acts only
once
In this paper, we study perfect information games played by an infinite
sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game.
For example, consider a game where a player can choose either 0 or 1.
Choosing 1 (safe move) leads to a payoff of 1 whereas choosing 0 (risky
move) leads to a payoff of 2 if minority of the players chose that action,
otherwise leads to a payoff of 0. This game does not admit a subgame
perfect e-equilibrium for any e sufficiently small. We call this type of
games as frequency-based minority game. A minority game is a type of
game where players make choices sequentially and those who end up
on the minority side win. Sometimes people prefer to be on the minority;
such examples can be found in fashion and stock exchange transactions.
Furthermore we show that games with certain conditions admits
subgame perfect e-equilibrium which is a stable state where there is no
profitable unilateral deviations with e > 0 error in payoffs.
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Multi-battle n-player dynamic contests
Primary elections are how political parties in the United States pick
their strongest candidate to run for president. The parties do this by
holding mini-elections in each of the states and the candidates with
the most delegates from these elections become their party’s official
nominee. These nominees then face each other in the national election
for presidency.
Winner-take-all representation rule characterizes a state election by
popular vote: winner in each state wins all the electoral votes of that state.
Proportional rule characterizes a state election by distributing delegates
in proportion to their votes. There are eight states in primary elections
that are winner-take-all, and they’re all on the Republican party.
The US presidential primaries is an example of sequential multiple-
battle n-player dynamic contests whereas presidential elections provide
an example of simultaneous but static (i.e., not dynamic) multi-battle
contests.
In this context, campaign resource allocation proportional to delegate
numbers is desirable. We show that when players (candidates) max-
imize their expected number of delegates, there is an equilibrium—a
stable state— in which players (candidates) allocate their resources pro-
portionally throughout the states. However, when players maximize
their probability of winning, proportionality is not satisfied for dynmaic
contests with at least 4 number of states and at least 2 delegates.
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